I spent a week recently at Emerge Lakefront for the Planet Health conference — a gathering that self-organized around three distinct but overlapping streams of work: Wisdom Infrastructure, Network Nations, and Symbients. Because it was so wide-ranging, I’ll just try to give you a taste of what each of those meant.
Bryan, It will be curious to compare your rejection of teleology with Jesper Hoffman's recognition, in Biosemiotics, of the necessary orientation of living systems to Peirce's conception of final causation, which differs from Aristotle's. There are long-standing arguments in philosophy against Aristotle's version. But Peirce's larger outlook is currently embraced by scientists as diverse as Rupert Sheldrake and Lee Smolin. Are you standing against Peirce and his heirs, or just taking the conventional stance against Aristotle's formulation?
As Hoffmeyer writes, "Living systems are anticipatory." The future, as held by our anticipations at many levels, is causal.
"[W]e cannot resist our natural Anticipation in behalf of Nature; according to whose suppos’d Standard we perpetually approve and disapprove, and to whom in all natural Appearances, all moral Actions (whatever we contemplate, whatever we have in debate) we inevitably appeal."
Thanks for this! If I understand it correctly, I think Shaftesbury supports my position. Shaftesbury identifies the very anthropomorphic projection I'm warning against: we "cannot resist" attributing our own goal-directedness to Nature, then treat this projection as an objective standard.
Spinoza likewise warned against this anthropomorphism (as does Nietzsche in the Gay Science). Here's Spinoza:
> All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end, for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God.
This anthropomorphic tendency itself will have arisen out of conditions which favoured it. It's more adaptive, for example, to suspect human intervention if you find your window broken, even if it turns out to have been an "act of nature." A false positive in this case could serve better than a false negative.
I read Shaftesbury as intending the opposite reading. He made the larger case that our recognition of virtue is akin to our aesthetic appreciation of beauty. This is what Hutcheson developed into moral sense theory, and Adam Smith into the theory of moral sentiments. In these framings virtue is grounded in the senses, not in reasoning. Perceiving virtue is not a rational act; even though we often rationalize about it. Shaftesbury also was familiar with, and argued against, the cliche that beauty is just in the mind of the beholder. His case for virtue was likewise aligned, that it is there in nature before us, along with and inseparable from nature's beauty. He was also widely regarded as an atheist, although he was careful to hedge his critique so as to remain within social acceptance.
Shaftesbury also wrote of "our own Species, as in other Creatures" in which "we may indeed discern in the preparatory Labours and Arts of these wild Creatures; which demonstrate their anticipating Fancys, Pre-conceptions, or Pre-sensations...." So in his view anticipation and goal-directedness is inherent and of essential use in animate life. He's not urging us to deny that, but making the case that such denial contradicts the obvious for anyone who well observes animal behavior.
I wasn't familiar with Hoffman or Hoffmeyer; I know of Sheldrake and Smolin but haven't read their work either. I've read parts of Peirce's _Collected Papers_ however. My opposition to teleological explanations would, I think, extend to Peirce (who is also a "realist" when it comes to natural kinds, which I think is linked to the teleological view). From what I know of Peirce, he might give a version of teleology that's better, in some senses, than Aristotle's. But just as Aristotle's is better, in some senses, than Plato's, but introduces new problems, I suspect Peirce's would introduce new ones too. In short, all three of them end up positing something metaphysical which is unexplained. (The "demiurge" explanation of _telos_ for Plato, "substance" and _telos_ in life for Aristotle, and "thirdness" for Peirce.) Plato cannot answer why the demiurge has goals; Aristotle cannot explain why life has goals; and Peirce cannot explain why thirdness should exist. Peirce (unless I'm misunderstanding him) is saying that "patterns exist because of the tendency towards patterns."
I do not deny that living systems are anticipatory; I simply deny that this anticipation can be explained by just saying that it's in the nature of living systems, since that begs the question. My position is like this: "Living systems have goals. Where does this goal-seeking arise?" Answering "from their goal-seeking nature" is not a sufficient answer for me.
To put it another way, living systems come to anticipate, but if that is the case, then the reason given for this quality cannot be "anticipation," because the question of _why_ living systems anticipate remains unanswered in that case.
Vygotsky, Wilhelm Reich, and Kuhn each oppose this kind of circularity in different ways (perhaps Vygotsky most explicitly, in _Thought and Language_).
I also think that, because we ourselves are teleological and tend to anthropomorphize, we need to be especially careful not to affect the process under study with the process _of_ our study. As Reich argues, this means that we don't isolate some part of nature, then mistake "isolation" as part of its basic nature, since that was something _we_ introduced. Isolation is indispensable for the process of studying, but it cannot be projected onto what we study. Similarly, teleology is indispensable for our taking any action at all, but we must not project this outside of its scope.
I'm not asking "What is the nature of goal-seeking?" but "Under what conditions does goal-seeking emerge and stabilize?" If Hoffmeyer and others see living systems as different from non-living systems, then there must have been some historical set of conditions that led to the change from one to the other — unless they posit a metaphysical force or God (which I think is a very common move when asked this question).
Bryan, Thanks for the considered response. I'll admit to little respect for Vygotsky. Hoffmeyer does not posit a metaphysical force or God. However, I take it you are a physicalist? You believe the world is simply what classical physics makes of it? That wouldn't square with Kuhn's recognition of paradigm shifts beyond that.
All systems of understanding have to posit some beginning set of assumptions, axioms. Then the proof of the value of the system is how far you can go with it in predicting reality. As a well-known example, relativity theory and quantum theory differ in their axioms, clearly contradict each other, and yet each is highly successful in explanation. But neither offers a complete explanation. We still need both. We may need others too.
Versions of panpsychism, in which consciousness is basic to the universe, have long been entertained (e.g. Russell, Edington) and are currently in resurgence. There is much to be observed in living systems, as detailed in Robert Rosen's Life Itself, which displays obvious teleology -- not just among human endeavors, but again as biosemiotics shows down to the sub-cellular level, and in single-celled life. Many interpretations of quantum physics also posit consciousness as fundamental to existence, at the base level, thus not to be explained by something else.
Personally, I've no belief in God. Nor am I allergic to metaphysical explanations. But the accumulating evidence for teleology throughout living systems suggests we do best to accept it, even short of an explanation of when and how it made its initial entry to existence. The tendency to see such acceptance as mere anthropomorphism goes back to Descartes' insane claim that all animals but us are mere robots, without real mind nor feeling.
Trying to explain absolutely everything from nothing, assuming nothing, how does that work? If the universe was created by the Big Bang, what created the Big Bang? Now, much a I like Roger Penrose's conjecture of a cycle of Big Bangs extending from an infinite past ... well, there you go, circularity. Can there be any set of foundational assumptions without it?
Bryan, It will be curious to compare your rejection of teleology with Jesper Hoffman's recognition, in Biosemiotics, of the necessary orientation of living systems to Peirce's conception of final causation, which differs from Aristotle's. There are long-standing arguments in philosophy against Aristotle's version. But Peirce's larger outlook is currently embraced by scientists as diverse as Rupert Sheldrake and Lee Smolin. Are you standing against Peirce and his heirs, or just taking the conventional stance against Aristotle's formulation?
As Hoffmeyer writes, "Living systems are anticipatory." The future, as held by our anticipations at many levels, is causal.
Or as Shaftesbury put it in Characteristicks:
"[W]e cannot resist our natural Anticipation in behalf of Nature; according to whose suppos’d Standard we perpetually approve and disapprove, and to whom in all natural Appearances, all moral Actions (whatever we contemplate, whatever we have in debate) we inevitably appeal."
Thanks for this! If I understand it correctly, I think Shaftesbury supports my position. Shaftesbury identifies the very anthropomorphic projection I'm warning against: we "cannot resist" attributing our own goal-directedness to Nature, then treat this projection as an objective standard.
Spinoza likewise warned against this anthropomorphism (as does Nietzsche in the Gay Science). Here's Spinoza:
> All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end, for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God.
This anthropomorphic tendency itself will have arisen out of conditions which favoured it. It's more adaptive, for example, to suspect human intervention if you find your window broken, even if it turns out to have been an "act of nature." A false positive in this case could serve better than a false negative.
I read Shaftesbury as intending the opposite reading. He made the larger case that our recognition of virtue is akin to our aesthetic appreciation of beauty. This is what Hutcheson developed into moral sense theory, and Adam Smith into the theory of moral sentiments. In these framings virtue is grounded in the senses, not in reasoning. Perceiving virtue is not a rational act; even though we often rationalize about it. Shaftesbury also was familiar with, and argued against, the cliche that beauty is just in the mind of the beholder. His case for virtue was likewise aligned, that it is there in nature before us, along with and inseparable from nature's beauty. He was also widely regarded as an atheist, although he was careful to hedge his critique so as to remain within social acceptance.
Shaftesbury also wrote of "our own Species, as in other Creatures" in which "we may indeed discern in the preparatory Labours and Arts of these wild Creatures; which demonstrate their anticipating Fancys, Pre-conceptions, or Pre-sensations...." So in his view anticipation and goal-directedness is inherent and of essential use in animate life. He's not urging us to deny that, but making the case that such denial contradicts the obvious for anyone who well observes animal behavior.
Hi Whit,
Thanks so much for your question.
I wasn't familiar with Hoffman or Hoffmeyer; I know of Sheldrake and Smolin but haven't read their work either. I've read parts of Peirce's _Collected Papers_ however. My opposition to teleological explanations would, I think, extend to Peirce (who is also a "realist" when it comes to natural kinds, which I think is linked to the teleological view). From what I know of Peirce, he might give a version of teleology that's better, in some senses, than Aristotle's. But just as Aristotle's is better, in some senses, than Plato's, but introduces new problems, I suspect Peirce's would introduce new ones too. In short, all three of them end up positing something metaphysical which is unexplained. (The "demiurge" explanation of _telos_ for Plato, "substance" and _telos_ in life for Aristotle, and "thirdness" for Peirce.) Plato cannot answer why the demiurge has goals; Aristotle cannot explain why life has goals; and Peirce cannot explain why thirdness should exist. Peirce (unless I'm misunderstanding him) is saying that "patterns exist because of the tendency towards patterns."
I do not deny that living systems are anticipatory; I simply deny that this anticipation can be explained by just saying that it's in the nature of living systems, since that begs the question. My position is like this: "Living systems have goals. Where does this goal-seeking arise?" Answering "from their goal-seeking nature" is not a sufficient answer for me.
To put it another way, living systems come to anticipate, but if that is the case, then the reason given for this quality cannot be "anticipation," because the question of _why_ living systems anticipate remains unanswered in that case.
Vygotsky, Wilhelm Reich, and Kuhn each oppose this kind of circularity in different ways (perhaps Vygotsky most explicitly, in _Thought and Language_).
I also think that, because we ourselves are teleological and tend to anthropomorphize, we need to be especially careful not to affect the process under study with the process _of_ our study. As Reich argues, this means that we don't isolate some part of nature, then mistake "isolation" as part of its basic nature, since that was something _we_ introduced. Isolation is indispensable for the process of studying, but it cannot be projected onto what we study. Similarly, teleology is indispensable for our taking any action at all, but we must not project this outside of its scope.
I'm not asking "What is the nature of goal-seeking?" but "Under what conditions does goal-seeking emerge and stabilize?" If Hoffmeyer and others see living systems as different from non-living systems, then there must have been some historical set of conditions that led to the change from one to the other — unless they posit a metaphysical force or God (which I think is a very common move when asked this question).
Does that make sense?
Bryan
Bryan, Thanks for the considered response. I'll admit to little respect for Vygotsky. Hoffmeyer does not posit a metaphysical force or God. However, I take it you are a physicalist? You believe the world is simply what classical physics makes of it? That wouldn't square with Kuhn's recognition of paradigm shifts beyond that.
All systems of understanding have to posit some beginning set of assumptions, axioms. Then the proof of the value of the system is how far you can go with it in predicting reality. As a well-known example, relativity theory and quantum theory differ in their axioms, clearly contradict each other, and yet each is highly successful in explanation. But neither offers a complete explanation. We still need both. We may need others too.
Versions of panpsychism, in which consciousness is basic to the universe, have long been entertained (e.g. Russell, Edington) and are currently in resurgence. There is much to be observed in living systems, as detailed in Robert Rosen's Life Itself, which displays obvious teleology -- not just among human endeavors, but again as biosemiotics shows down to the sub-cellular level, and in single-celled life. Many interpretations of quantum physics also posit consciousness as fundamental to existence, at the base level, thus not to be explained by something else.
Personally, I've no belief in God. Nor am I allergic to metaphysical explanations. But the accumulating evidence for teleology throughout living systems suggests we do best to accept it, even short of an explanation of when and how it made its initial entry to existence. The tendency to see such acceptance as mere anthropomorphism goes back to Descartes' insane claim that all animals but us are mere robots, without real mind nor feeling.
Trying to explain absolutely everything from nothing, assuming nothing, how does that work? If the universe was created by the Big Bang, what created the Big Bang? Now, much a I like Roger Penrose's conjecture of a cycle of Big Bangs extending from an infinite past ... well, there you go, circularity. Can there be any set of foundational assumptions without it?
Whit